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The Shining City and the Fortress: 
Reflections on the "Euro-solution" to the 
German Immigration Dilemmat 
Daniel Kanstroom* 
INTRODUCTION 
The aspiration toward what is generally referred to as a "European 
solution" of the German asylum/immigration dilemma l has long 
been a leitmotif in German politico-legal debate.2 Recently, as pro-
gress toward completion of the European Community (EC or Com-
munity) has moved center stage, it has been accompanied by ever 
increasing German interest in multilateral initiatives relating to asy-
lum in particular and non-EC immigration more generally. There 
are powerful pragmatic arguments to be made in support of such 
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I This essay is a continuation of the detailed analysis of the current nature and history of 
German laws of citizenship, immigration, and alienage which appears in Daniel Kanstroom, 
Wer Sind WiT Wieder: Laws of Asylum, Immigration, and Citizenship in the Struggle far the Soul 
of the New Germany, 18 YALEJ. INT'L L. 155 (1993). The reader may find it useful to read that 
piece first in order to understand more fully the internal German legal system relating to 
these issues. 
2 The term "politico-legal discourse" means government, political, and scholarly statements 
that purport to be interpretations of or justifications for specific legal structures as well as 
statements that implicitly rely upon legal structures for their meaning. This terminology 
arguably conflates categories which, for other purposes, might usefully be separated. But the 
basic point is to distinguish broadly between statements that refer (explicitly or implicitly) to 
law from those which do not, these subtleties are best saved for another day. 
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supra-national structures. The broad EC goal of free movement and 
residence surely cannot be realized without at least a substantial 
coordination of non-EC national immigration.3 In the highly 
charged asylum debate, the need for multilateral action seems even 
greater. German commentators advocate substantive, procedural, 
and institutional harmonization in order to avoid multiple asylum 
requests, uneven burdens throughout the Community, and the 
problems caused by lengthy administrative and judicial procedures.4 
Despite the functionalist appeal of these arguments, another as-
pect of this movement toward Euro-immigration and asylum policy 
is worth considering: its tendency to accept the most restrictive 
"lowest common denominator" models and to overlook the deep 
social effects of viewing immigration as primarily an economic ques-
tion. Among the more subtle matters, these effects include perpetu-
ation of the dangerous notion that asylum seekers are, in essence, a 
plague. Using Germany as a touchstone, this Article examines, from 
both a legal and broader social perspective, the most significant 
European measures taken to date on immigration and asylum. 
Its focus is on three related questions. First, to what extent, if at 
all, might Community rules of free movement for EC workers pro-
vide a paradigm or model for EC control of immigration from 
non-EC states into Germany? Second, how have the most recent and 
specific multilateral immigration and asylum initiatives-the Dublin 
Convention5 and the Schengen Agreement and Convention6-af-
fected Germany to date and what will their likely role be in a future 
Germany with an amended constitutional asylum provision? Finally, 
how might EC level conceptions of citizenship affect Germany's 
uniquely strict adherence to the jus sanguinis and its rather restric-
tive naturalization practice? 
Some of these questions, especially the first, have been considered 
3 See Kay Hailbronner & Jorg Polakiewicz, Non-EC Nationals in the European Community: 
The Need for a Coordinated Approach, 3 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 49, 77-79 (1992). 
4Id. at 86-88; see also Kay Hailbronner, Perspektiven einer europiiischen Asylrechtsharmon-
isierung nach der Maastrichter GipfelkonferertZ, 2 ZAR-ABHANDLUNGEN 51, 51 (1992). 
5 The European Community Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining 
Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of Member States of the European Communities, 
June 15,1990,30 I.L.M. 425 [hereinafter Dublin Convention]. 
6 Belgium-France-Federal Republic of Germany-Luxembourg-Netherlands: Schengen 
Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders and the Conven-
tion Applying the Agreement, AgreementJune 14, 1985, Convention June 19, 1990,30 I.L.M. 
68 [hereinafter Schengen Agreement and Convention]. 
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separately by German scholars.7 There is distinct value, however, in 
considering them together. The reason for this is that the European 
struggle over immigration and asylum raises much more than tech-
nical legal problems. It has focused public attention, if sometimes 
obliquely, on questions that are fundamental to the soul of the 
nation-state.8 
From this perspective, strong German support for EC control of 
immigration and asylum may represent more than a move to anchor 
Germany in the west or a pragmatic response to a technically 
difficult legal problem. It also represents an unfortunate bargain in 
which the German government rejects a highly protective constitu-
tional system in favor of a regime which seems far less likely to 
involve effective judicial review or even to compel the German 
people-as the current system does--to confront refugees and the 
asylum system daily. By linking this systemic shift to European inte-
gration, however, its proponents achieve substantial politicallegiti-
macy. 
Part I of this Article describes the current rules governing the free 
movement of EC nationals throughout the Community. The devel-
opment of these rules illustrates, first, a consistent evolution of the 
concept of free movement from a primarily instrumentalist, eco-
nomic idea to a much more expansive general right. The technical 
difficulties in a regime of free movement across even vestigial na-
tional borders are also apparent from this overview. Further, the 
necessary linkage between internal free movement and external 
border control becomes clear. In Part II, the question of external 
immigration and its most potent political aspect-asylum-are con-
sidered in more detail. The particular impediments, practical, legal, 
and political, are analyzed in regard to the current law of the EC, 
the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) ,9 the Schengen 
Agreement and Convention, and the Dublin Convention. The latter 
two initiatives are interpreted as well in light of the particular prob-
lems they raise for German law and society. In Part III, a broader 
approach is taken which seeks to relate these questions to the con-
cepts of nationalism, immigration, and citizenship in Europe. Fi-
7 See generally Hailbronner and Polakiewicz, supra note 3, see also Maryellen Fullerton, 
Restricting the Flow of Asylum-Seekers in Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
the Netherlands: New Challenges to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the Eurapean Convention on Human Rights, 29 VA.]' INT'L L. 33,64-74 (1988). 
8 See generally Kanstroom, supra note 1. 
9Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter 
Maastricht Treaty]. 
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nally, the interrelationships among these concepts are explored in 
light of both German and EC politico-legal developments. This 
Article concludes that a Community-wide vision of immigration as 
more than an economic question or a practical problem of border 
control is an essential component of the "Euro-solution." Though 
this aspiration surely becomes more difficult as Germany moves 
toward ever more restrictive immigration and asylum policies, that 
historical trend makes the need for it only greater. 
I. FREE MOVEMENT OF EC NATIONALS 
Nothing has been more critical to the developing concept of the 
European internal market than the free movement of persons, 
goods, and services. Initially, the movement of persons was linked 
rather closely to specific economic goals. The Treaty Establishing 
the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) 10 envisioned "the 
abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of 
movement for persons, services and capital."11 Such freedom of 
movement, however, was related to the underlying purposes of the 
Community, described in Article 2 as "a harmonious development 
of economic activities."12 Thus, it is black letter law that Articles 
4S-51 of the EEC Treaty, which govern freedom of movement, 
confer this freedom upon EC nationals as economic actors, not as 
citizens per se.13 The EEC Treaty, even as amended by the Single 
European Act (SEA), 14 provides no clear mandate for anything other 
than free movement for economic actors and their families. Article 
Sa of the EEC Treaty, added by the SEA, simply provides: "[t]he 
internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. "15 
A variety of Council Directives, Regulations, and decisions of the 
European Court of Justice have significantly expanded the class of 
10 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]. The Single 
European Act modified the EEC Treaty. 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA]. Among other 
things, the SEA envisioned the free movement of people within the Member States without 
any barriers, in contrast to the EEC Treaty which had limited this freedom to nationals of EC 
Member States as economic actors. Ricou Heaton, The European Community After 1992: The 
Freedom of Movement of People and Its Limitations, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 643, 644 (1992). 
11 EEC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 3c. 
12 [d. art. 2. 
13 Heaton, supra note 10, at 647 n.21. Additionally, as is discussed more fully below, the 
concept of a citizen as it relates to the EC is not so simple as it might appear. 
14 SEA, supra note 10. 
15EEC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 8a. 
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persons who benefit from Community rules of free movement over 
the years.16 The first basis for this expansion has involved the defini-
tion of the term "worker" under Article 48 of the EEC Treaty. 
Neither Article 48, nor any applicable directive or regulation fully 
defines the term worker. Article 48(2), however, by referring to 
"employment" and "remuneration," sets the broad parameters of a 
definition, especially when contrasted with Articles 52 and 59.17 
The European Court of Justice has, over the years, also fleshed 
out the definition of the term worker considerably. Initially, it must 
be understood that the term is an EC term of art, not something 
that can be determined under national law. IS In 1974, in Sotgiu v. 
Deutsche Bundespost, the Court further stated that the professional 
title of a particular worker and whether the employment contract 
was a public or private one were irrelevant under Community law. 19 
A series of cases throughout the mid-1970s dealt with a wide variety 
of questionable employment situations, including au pairs,20 cy-
clists,21 and football players.22 In 1986, the European Court of Justice 
attempted to construct a comprehensive definition of the term 
worker under Community law. In La71ff'ie-Blum v. Baden-Wiirttemberg, 
the Court held that a worker is "any person performing for remu-
neration work the nature of which is not determined by himself for 
and under the control of another, regardless of the legal nature of 
the employment relationship."23 
In light of this rather general definition, the decisions of the 
Court may be summed up as follows. First, a worker under Commu-
nity law need not be employed full-time. Even a university student 
who works part-time to support the costs of study has Community 
law rights to freedom of movement.24 Moreover, the Court has rec-
ognized that a worker under Article 48 does not actually have to be 
16 See generally Marc Van der Woude & Philip Mead, Free M(!(}ement of the Tourist in Commu-
nity Law, 25 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 117, 118-22 (1988). 
17 Article 52 of the EEC Treaty addresses self-employed persons and Article 59 deals with 
the freedom to provide services. See G. Frederico Mancini, The Free Movement of Workers in 
the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice, in CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL LAW 67, 68 (Dierdre Curtin & David O'Keefe eds., 1992). 
18 See Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatsecretaris van Justitie, 1982 E.C.R. 1035. 
19Case 152/73, 1974 E.C.R. 153. 
20 See Case 118/75, Watson and Belmann, 1976 E.C.R. 1185. 
21 See Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974 
E.C.R. 1405. 
22 See Case 13/76, Dona v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333. 
23 Case 66/85, 1986 E.C.R. 2121. 
24 Mancini, supra note 17, at 69 (citing Case 197/86, Brown v. Secretary of State for 
Scotland, 1988 E.c.R. 3205). 
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working at all. A person may be preparing to work25 or may remain 
after work to study.26 Even persons who simply intend to or wish to 
work have rights under Article 48. 
In Antonissen, the Court made clear that a Member State could 
require an unemployed non-national to leave after six months. 27 The 
affected person, however, has the right to demonstrate that he or 
she is continuing to seek employment and has a genuine chance of 
finding a job.28 Free movement under Article 48(3) thus includes 
the right of non-nationals from other Member States not only to 
move freely within the Community to seek employment, but to 
reside in other Member States for considerable periods of time even 
if they have not yet found work.29 The Court, as one commentator 
has noted, has powerfully diluted the concept of "economic activity" 
which, under Article 2 of the EEC Treaty was supposed to be the 
touchstone of free movement. 30 Indeed, to date, the only categorical 
exclusions of ostensible "workers" from the protections of the Treaty 
have been drug addicts engaged in public employment the goal of 
which was rehabilitation,3l 
Beyond the broadened definition of "worker," Community law has 
developed quite specific and extensive rules governing rights of 
entry and residence,32 rights of access to and conditions of employ-
ment,33 and rights to remain in the territory of Member States after 
employment ends.34 Though a full explication of this system is be-
yond the scope of this Article, the basic guidelines may be usefully 
summarized as follows. EC national workers and their families35 have 
the right to leave their country36 and to enter the territory of a 
25 See Lawrie-Blum v. Baden-Wiirttemberg, supra note 23. 
26 See Case 39/86, Lair v. Universitat Hannover, 1988 E.C.R. 3161. 
27 Case C-292/89, R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Antonissen, (judgment of 26 
February 1991), cited in Mancini, supra note 17, at 69; see also Case 48/75, Procureur du Roi 
v. Royer, 1976 E.C.R. 497. 
28 Mancini, supra note 17, at 69. 
29 [d. 
30 [d. at 70. 
3l Case 344/87, Bettray v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1989 E.C.R. 1621. The Court has also 
systematically denied claims under Article 48 in so-called "domestic" cases which are deemed 
not to raise bona fide questions of Community law. See Mancini, supra note 17, at 70. 
32 See Council Directive 68/360, 1968 OJ. SPEC. ED. 485. 
33 See Council Regulation 1612/68, 1968 OJ. SPEC. ED. 33. 
34 See Council Regulation 1251/70, 1970 OJ. SPEC. ED. 402. 
35 Family is defined by Regulation 1612/68 as the worker's spouse and descendants under 
the age of 21, as well as certain dependents in the ascendant line of the worker and spouse. 
Art. 10(1) (a), (b). The Court has recognized rights of co-habitating persons under certain 
circumstances, Case 59/85, Netherlands v. Reed, 1986 E.C.R. 1283, as well as separated 
spouses. Case 267/83, Diatta v. Land Berlin, 1985 E.C.R. 567. 
36 Directive 68/360, supra note 32, art. 3(1). 
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Member State simply upon production of a valid identity card or 
passportY Mter entry, EC workers and family members have the 
right to obtain a residence permit consonant with the purposes of 
their entry.38 Further, and most broadly, Article 48(2) of the EEC 
Treaty prohibits any discrimination based upon nationality among 
EC workers as to employment itself, remuneration, and conditions 
of employment. Similarly, Regulation 1612/68 mandates full equal-
ity of treatment as to the activities of employed persons and the 
mobility of workers and their families. 39 Workers who are retired 
have rights to remain in the territory of their state of employment 
under certain circumstances,4o as do their familiesY 
The Court has construed these rules broadly. In Commission v. 
France,42 for example, the Court held that both Article 48 of the EEC 
Treaty and Regulation 1612/68 had direct effect.43 For practical 
purposes, this has meant that the sovereign power of EC Member 
States to grant or refuse to grant residence permits to EC nationals 
has been ceded.44 Thus, the right of entry and residence is a matter 
of Community law, and "[t]he issue of a [residence] permit is ... 
reduced to a mere formality."45 In fact, in a recent case referred to 
it by the German Federal Administrative Court, the European Court 
of Justice held that Member States are obliged to issue a residence 
permit to a person holding a national identity card from another 
Member State even if that card did not authorize the person to leave 
the territory of the issuing Member State.46 
Community law, however, does recognize important restrictions to 
the general right offree movementY Article 48(3) of the EEC Treaty 
37 [d. art. 3(2). Entry visas may, however, be required of non-EC national family members. 
38 [d. art. 4. 
39Regulation 1612/68, supra note 33, art. 3(1), (2). 
40 Regulation 1251/70 grants this right to a worker who reaches the statutory age of 
entitlement to an old-age pension if the worker has been employed for at least the previous 
12 months and has resided in the state of employment for more than three years. The 
Regulation also grants rights to incapacitated workers and so-called "frontier workers" (those 
who work in one state while retaining residence in another). [d. art. 2(1) (a)-(c). 
41 [d. at pmbl.; Regulation 1612/68, supra note 33, art. lO(3). Article 10(3) of Regulation 
1612/68 provides a derivative right for family members to remain if the worker is entitled to 
do so. However, for family members to obtain residence permits, the worker must show that 
housing is available for them. See Case 249/86, Commission v. Germany, 1989 E.C.R. 1263. In 
addition, the Maastricht Treaty amends the EEC Treaty to provide for a right of residence for 
EC nationals in any Member State. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 9, art. G(c), 8A(1). 
42 Case 167/73, 1974 E.C.R. 359. 
43 [d. at 371. 
44 [d. 
45 Mancini, supra note 17, at 71. 
46 Case C-376/89, Giagourdis v. City of Reutlingen, I (CEC(CCH)) 751 95,891 (1993). 
47 Article 48(4) of the EEC Treaty, which permits Member States to deny or restrict access 
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provides that the right may be limited on the grounds of "public 
policy, public security or public health, , , ."48 Directive 64/221,49 
which implements this broad mandate, requires that restrictions 
undertaken pursuant to Article 48(3) must be based upon the per-
sonal conduct of the individual.50 As Directive 64/221 is directly 
effective, it has led to a rather complex and sometimes inconsistent 
body of decisional law from the Court.51 
One basic problem has been the definition of the concept of 
"public policy" itself in this context. Obviously, the term cannot be 
defined unilaterally by a Member State if it is to retain validity as an 
EC standard.52 In the well-known Rutili case,53 the Court of Justice 
held that restrictions may not be placed on an EC worker's rights to 
enter a Member State, and to live and move freely there unless the 
worker's presence constitutes "a genuine and sufficiently serious 
threat to public policy."54 Further, the Court held, under Article 7 
of the EEC Treaty, that partial restrictions on the movement of a 
non-national are only permissible if such restrictions may be placed 
on nationals as well. 55 The rather vague language of Rutili was 
refined somewhat in R v. Bouchereau56 where the Court again lim-
ited the invocation of the public policy restriction to situations that 
involve a genuine and serious threat to a fundamental interest of 
the society. 57 
More recently, a 1990 Council Directive58 addressing health insur-
to workers employed in the public service, has been very narrowly construed by the Court 
and is of little practical importance for most EC nationals. At present the restriction only 
applies to high level posts and those requiring special allegiance such as the armed forces, 
police, etc. See, e.g., Case 307/84, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 1725 (French nurses); 
Case 33/88, Allue & Coonan v. Universita degli studi di Venezia, 1989 E.C.R. 1591 (teachers 
in state universities not covered). 
48EEC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 48(3). Article 56 contains a similar rule for the self-em-
ployed. 
49 Directive 64/221,1963-64 OJ. SPEC. ED. 117. 
50 [d. art. 3(1). Involuntary unemployment or incapacity will not deny a worker the right of 
residence. 
5! Mancini, supra note 17, at 74-76. 
52 Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337 (details may vary from state to 
state but full scope of term cannot be unilaterally determined). 
53 Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219. 
54 [d. at 1231. 
55 [d. at 1235. 
56 Case 30/77,1977 E.C.R. 1999. 
57 [d. Thus, criminal convictions alone, absent a showing of a present threat, will not be 
sufficient. [d. 
58 Council Directive 90/364, art. 1, 1990 OJ. (L 180) 26. 
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ance and social assistance, provided another restriction to free move-
ment. It held that applicants for entry must possess health insurance 
and demonstrate that they have sufficient resources to avoid becom-
ing a "burden on the social assistance system of the host Member 
State during their period of residence."59 Though these limitations 
may be viewed as partial concessions to the sovereign autonomy of 
the Member States, it is not clear how much practical significance 
they have.60 
II. HARMONIZATION OF IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES IN 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
A. Non-EC Immigration 
There has long been a consensus within the EC that a coordinated 
immigration and asylum policy is a necessary, if not essential, com-
ponent of the 1992 vision.61 Few would argue with the assessment of 
Douglas Hurd of Great Britain, who during a September 1992 meet-
ing of EC foreign ministers, called immigration "the most serious 
problem facing Europe. "62 The first formal problem for the EC in 
this arena has been a longstanding question of competence.63 While 
rights of free movement for EC nationals have expanded through 
broad readings of the Treaties and secondary legislation, as noted 
above, no such development has occurred with regard to non-EC 
nationals. 
In recent years there has been debate over whether the goal of 
Article 8a of the EEC Treaty-the abolition of internal border con-
trols-can be achieved at all without a coordinated EC external 
border control regime. The basic problem as one commentator has 
put it, is that "if one removes border controls for one class of 
59Id. 
60 It should also be noted that neither the 1990 Directives, nor Community law generally, 
provide much support for Community nationals who claim a right to reside in their own 
Member State against the provisions of local law. Indeed, the general rule is that Community 
law only helps such a person when he or she is returning to the Member State after having 
exercised freedom of movement under Community law to carryon an economic activity in 
another Member State. See Andrew C. Evans, Nationality Law and European Integration, 16 
EUR. L. REV. 190, 203 (1992). 
61 On the Borderline, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23,1991, at 58. 
62 Refugees: Keep Out, ECONOMIST, Sept 19, 1992, at 64. 
63 See Bertold Huber, Asyl-und Ausliinderrecht in der Europiiischen Gemeinschajt, 7 NEUE 
VERWALTUNGS ZEITSCHRIFT (NVwZ) 618,619 (1992). 
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persons, it becomes impossible to maintain them for another.64 Full 
internal free movement thus inevitably requires consideration of the 
thorny questions of non-EC immigration and asylum. Even if the EC 
could prevent all future immigration into the Community (a pat-
ently impossible proposition), the problem of non-EC nationals 
would remain. There are already more than eight million non-EC 
nationals in the Community.65 The Commission, and indeed every 
Member State except for the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Den-
mark, now takes the position that Article 8a empowers the Commu-
nity to adopt rules for the free movement not only of EC nationals, 
but of non-EC entrants as wel1.66 
There has long been agreement on the desirability of harmoniza-
tion.67 As early as 1985, the Commission asserted that a harmoniza-
tion of asylum and non-EC immigration policies was an essential 
component of the move toward an open area without internal bor-
ders.68 Nonetheless, Member States are not willing to cede com-
pletely sovereign prerogative over this most politically charged is-
sue.69 To date, there appears little likelihood that the Community 
will be able to develop directly70 a comprehensive immigration pol-
icy. 71 
64 David O'Keefe, The Free Mavement of Persons and the Single Market, 17 EUR. L. REV. 3, 8 
(1992). 
65Id. This represents some 2.5 percent of the total population. Id. 
66 See Completing the Internal Market; Removal of Physical Frontiers; Control of Individuals: 
Current Problems and 1992 Objectives, Eur. Info. Serv.,Jan. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe 
Library, Info 92 File [hereinafter Completing the Internal Marketl. 
67 See, e.g., Political Declaration by the Governments of the Member States on the Free 
Movement of Persons, Feb. 17 and 28, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 505. 
68Id. 
69 Association agreements with third states also provide a source of authority for Community 
control of third state nationals. See, e.g., Case 12/86, Demirel v. Statdt Schwaebisch Gmund, 
1987 E.C.R. 3719,1 C.M.L.R. 421 (1989) (Association Agreement with Turkey and additional 
protocol not sufficiently precise to grant rights to individual Turkish workers); see also Hail-
bronner & Polakiewicz, supra note 3, at 55. 
70 But see discussion of the Schengen process, infra Part II.C. 
n Some have argued that EC competence over an immigration policy could be grounded 
in Article 5(2) of the EEC Treaty, which requires that Member States not jeopardize the 
attainment of the goals of the EEC Treaty and Article 234(3), which aspires toward eliminating 
incompatibilities between the EEC Treaty and other prior agreements. See Hailbronner, supra 
note 4, at 50-51; (Joined Cases 281/85, 283-285/85, and 287/85, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and V.K. v. Commission 1987 E.C.R. 3203, 1 C.M.L.R. 11 (1988» 
(migration policies of Member States must at least take into account EC objectives, particularly 
labor market policy). Hailbronner and Polakiewicz also argue that the Community can, under 
Article 49, regulate the access to the labor market of third country nationals already residing 
in the territory of a Member State. See supra note 3, at 55. It should be noted that such rules 
would be particularly controversial insofar as they applied to legal residents' right to work 
within the Member State which granted legal residence. 
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As a result, developments in non-EC national immigration policy 
have proceeded sporadically. The Commission acknowledges that 
the Member States did not abolish controls at internal frontiers by 
the target date of January 1, 1993.72 In addition, a recent meeting 
in Budapest of representatives of thirty-five European countries to 
debate a convention on immigration made little progress,73 though 
general agreement was reached to criminalize "smuggling" of un-
documented immigrants and to fine airlines, and land and sea 
carriers who do not do sufficient checks.74 
The Maastricht Treaty contains provisions which would grant the 
Community certain important powers over the entry and residence 
of non-EC nationals. Article 100C contains specific procedural rules 
under which the Council can determine which non-EC nationals 
require visas to cross the external borders of Member States. Article 
100 states that the Council, after consultation with the European 
Parliament, may act "unanimously" on a proposal from the Commis-
sion to determine such visa requirements.75 Title VI, Article K1 
further provides an extensive list of matters deemed to be "of com-
mon interest."76 This list includes asylum policy, control of external 
borders, immigration policy, and policy regarding third-party na-
tionals. Thus, a unanimous decision by the Council could lead to 
Community control of at least some aspects of both asylum and 
immigration policy. Article K2 also expressly requires that all of the 
matters referred to in Article K 1 be dealt with in compliance with 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Human Rights Convention)77 
and the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Geneva Convention),78 as amended by the New York Protocop9 
72 See Completing the Internal Market, supra note 66. 
73 Immigration: 12-Sided Shambles Turning Into 35-Sided Defeat, Eur. Info. Serv., Feb. 17, 
1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AHeur File. The main aspects of the debated report 
of a working party established in 1991 were harmonized penalties for those who "smuggle" 
illegal aliens into Europe, improved surveillance at borders, development of multilateral 
deportation agreements, and information exchange. Id. As European Commissioner Padraig 
Flyn noted, however, this agenda seems far too ambitious to tackle simultaneously. Id. 
74 Nicholas Denton, European Ministers Agree to New Anti-Immigration Measures, FIN. TIMES, 
Feb. 17, 1993, at 2. 
75 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 9, tit. II, art. G(D) (23) (amending EEC Treaty to insert 
100(c)(3)). Mter January 1, 1996, this will be liberalized to a qualified majority. Id. 
76Id. tit. VI, art. K.1. 
77 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950,213 V.N.T.S. 221. 
78 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,1951,189 V.N.T.S. 137 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention). 
79 New York Protocol, Jan. 31, 1967,606 V.N.T.S. 267, 61.L.M. 78 (1967). 
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The Maastricht Treaty further provides that policies undertaken 
pursuant to Article K.l must take into account "the protection af-
forded by Member States to persons persecuted on political 
grounds."80 Thus, Member States which, like Germany, have more 
liberal asylum policies should not be forced by Article K.l to adopt 
more restrictive regimes.8! Further, Article K. 7 authorizes "the estab-
lishment or development of closer cooperation between two or more 
Member States" as to matters deemed of common interest, provided 
such cooperation does not conflict with or impede that provided for 
by Title VI. As recent events in Budapest82 indicate, however, serious 
obstacles remain to a harmonized European immigration regime. 
Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty recognizes the continuing authority 
of Member States over "the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguards of internal security. "83 
B. Asylum Policy 
Rather than an approach to the refugee and asylum issue 
rooted in human rights strategies, there is a preoccupation 
with immigration control and the more pressing political 
80 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 9, tit. VI. art. K.2. 
81 See Huber, supra note 63, at 619. 
82 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 9, tit. II, art. G(23), art. 100 (c) (5). 
83Id. New Article 100(c) (5) states: "This article shall be without prejudice to the exercise 
of the responsibilities incumbent upon the Member States with regard to the maintenance of 
law and order and the safeguarding of internal security." 
Turkish workers, however, have been a focal point of attention for years. In 1973, the EC 
and Turkey agreed to work towards the goal of free movement for Turkish workers by 1986. 
Agreement of 24 December 1973 Establishing an Association Between the European Eco-
nomic Community and Turkey, 1973 OJ. (C ll3) 1,5. Moreover, the European Commission 
recently confirmed that Turkish nationals residing legally in countries which are parties to 
the Schengen Agreement and Convention will have the right to travel without a visa. EC Talks 
on Free Movement and Social Rights of Turkish Workers EmplllJed in EC Member States, Agence 
Europe, Feb. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AHeur File. 
Agreements between the EC and the European Free Trade Association (Austria, Finland, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland), as yet unratified, also contain 
provisions for free movement of persons. See EC and EFTA Agree on Creation of a European 
Economic Area, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 'I 96,107 (1992). Agreements relating in part to 
the movement of workers have also been signed between the EC and Hungary, the former 
state of Czechoslovakia, and Poland. See George B. Hefferan III & Joanne Katsantonis, 
Movement Towards An Internal Market in 1993: An Overview of Current Legal Developments in 
the European Community, 3 DUKE]' COMPo & INT'L L. 1,45-46 (1993). A recent decision of 
the European Court of Justice has granted a right of residence to Turkish workers on the 
basis of the Association Agreement and protocol and two earlier Council Decisions. Case 
C-192/89, S.Z. Sevince V. Staatssecretaris Van Justitie, 1990 E.C.R. 3461,3463-65,2 C.M.L.R. 
57,60-61 (1992) (the right to access to employment implies a right to residence). 
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priorities of economic development and security, particu-
larly those associated with the realization of the Single 
European Act and the creation of a common market of the 
European Community by or about 1992.84 
213 
Prior to Maastricht, there was nothing in the Treaties which man-
dated or even clearly permitted a centralized asylum policy.85 The 
historical reasons for this are beyond the scope of this Article. What 
is important, however, is that throughout the 1980s, there has been 
a steadily increasing call for a Community asylum system.86 The main 
reason for the increased attention paid to this issue has been the 
sharply increasing number of asylum-seekers within the Community. 
Starting with approximately 72,000 in 1983, the number rose steadily 
throughout the decade to some 328,000 in 1990, and has continued 
to rise in the early 1 990s. 87 
A very large number of these asylum-seekers came first to Ger-
many: some 61 percent in 1988, 54 percent in 1989, and 62 percent 
in 1990,88 a fact which accounts both for the German government's 
interest in the issue and its desire for a multilateral solution. The 
essential problems in achieving such a policy have been due largely 
to the procedural difficulties inherent in coordinating a regime that 
is governed both by rather vague international standards and by 
positive domestic law, including in Germany, constitutional law. Fur-
ther, the issue is one of deep historical resonance and generates 
great political controversy. 
The German government in recent years has been one of the 
strongest proponents ofa highly coordinated system of both non-EC 
immigration and asylum within the European Community.89 In Lux-
embourg, in June 1991, the German government went so far as to 
propose that all questions of asylum, immigration, and matters re-
84Philip Rudge, Europe in the 1990s: The Berlin Walls of the Mind, WORLD REFUGEE SUR-
VEY-1989 IN REVIEW 20 (1990). 
85 See supra notes 61-83 and accompanying text. 
86 See, e.g., The Resolution of the European Parliament on Asylum Policy Contrary to Human 
Rights, Doc. B-2-512/87 of Dec. 1987, 1987 EuGRZ 444; see also Resolution on the Issues of the 
Right of Asylum of March 12, 1987,1987 EuGRZ 186; 'Vetter Report" of September 26,1986, 
adopted by the European Parliament on January 29, 1987. 
87 See Huber, supra note 63, at 619 (citing Vetter ed., Ein Mensch wie Du und ich. Fluchtlinge 
in der EG (1987) at 8, Table 2); see also Report of the European Commission on Immigration 
Law, PARL. EUR. Doc. (SEC 1857) 5 (1991) [hereinafter Commission Report on Immigration 
Law]. 
88 Huber, supra note 63, at 619. 
89 See infra notes 135-40. 
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lating to the status of third-party nationals be covered substantively 
in the Maastricht Treaty.90 
C. Specific Measures Toward A Harmonization of European 
Immigration and Asylum Law: Schengen and Dublin 
The two most important specific multilateral measures taken to 
date relating to asylum are the Schengen Agreement and Conven-
tion91 and the Dublin Convention.92 The Schengen process formally 
began on June 14, 1985 when Germany, France, and the Benelux 
countries concluded the Schengen Agreement.93 The 1985 Agree-
ment was in essence a political agreement under which the parties 
were to take steps to achieve its aims. The Agreement envisioned the 
abolition of all border control within the Schengen area. In particu-
lar, the parties were concerned with not only the movement of goods 
and services, but with common security and, most importantly, con-
trols on non-EC immigration.94 Because it contained relatively few 
specific obligations, the Agreement was to be applied by the parties 
on a provisional basis without the necessity ofratification.95 On June 
19, 1990, the original parties to the Schengen Agreement concluded 
a Convention which furthers the goals of the Agreement and con-
tains detailed rules governing the abolition of internal border 
checks on persons, and procedures for non-EC immigration.96 The 
Agreement and the Convention are considered as likely models, if 
not substitutes, for future EC legislation in the field of non-EC 
immigration.97 To date, there are nine members within the 
Schengen group. Italy formally joined the group in December 
1990.98 Portugal and Spain joined inJune 1991.99 Greece was granted 
observer status in June 1991. lOO 
The primary goal of the Agreement, as noted above, was the 
90 Huber, supra note 63, at 620. The Treaty, however, as discussed more fully above, with 
the limited exception of new Article 100(c), does not address these matters beyond terming 
them "matters of common interest." Maastricht Treaty, supra note 9, tit. VI, art. K.l. 
91 Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 6. 
92 Dublin Convention, supra note 5. 
93 Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 6. 
94 See Jean-Francois Bellis, Introductory Note to Schengen Agreement and Convention, 30 
I.L.M. 68 (1991). 
95 Schengen Agreement and Comvention, supra note 6, at tit. I, art. 32. 
96 See generally id. 
97 See Bellis, supra note 94, at 69; see also Hailbronner & Polakiewicz, supra note 3, at 60. 
98 Mancini, supra note 17, at 67. 
99Id. 
100Id. 
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elimination of all border controls among the parties. Articles 2-6 of 
the Agreement contained specific guidelines for minimal visual bor-
der checks and envisioned virtually complete free movement for EC 
nationals. Coordination of controls on illicit drug trafficking and 
other forms of crime was also considered. 101 Title II of the Agree-
ment, which covered "Measures Applicable in the Long Term," 
simply required that the Parties would "endeavour to abolish the 
controls at the common frontiers and transfer them to their external 
frontiers."102 This transfer of competence, however, focused most 
clearly on restrictions against illegal immigration, not a coordinated 
immigration policy of any sort. The language of Article 17 is reveal-
mg: 
[the Parties] shall endeavour to harmonize ... the laws 
and administrative provisions concerning the prohibitions 
and restrictions which form the basis for the controls and 
to take complementary measures to safeguard security and 
combat illegal immigration by nationals of States that are 
not members of the European Communities.103 
The Schengen Convention contains highly detailed rules for 
achieving the general goals defined in the 1985 Agreement. In 
particular, the Convention provides for the crossing of internal 
borders "without any checks on persons being carried out. "104 This 
complete freedom of movement, however, is substantially limited for 
non-EC nationals ("aliens" as defined by Article 1 of the Conven-
tion) , who must "declare" themselves "in accordance with the con-
ditions imposed by each Contracting Party."105 Indeed, this obliga-
tion of bringing oneself to the attention of local authorities applies 
even to long-term resident aliens when they travel within the inter-
nal territory.106 The Convention also contains detailed provisions for 
police cooperation l07 and the development of a massive new infor-
mation system.108 
lOi Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 6, tit. I, arts. 8-10. 
102ld. tit. I, art. 17. 
103ld. 
lO4ld. tit. II, ch. 1, art. 2(1). "In the interest of public policy or national security, limited 
internal border checks may be maintained so long as the party consults with the other parties." 
Id. tit. II, ch. 1, art. 2(2). 
!05Id. tit. II, ch. 4, art. 22(1). 
106 Id. tit. II, ch. 4, art. 22(2). 
107Id. tit. III. 
108 Id. tit. IV. 
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In order to facilitate free movement across internal borders, the 
Convention contains highly detailed and rather strict external bor-
der control mechanisms.109 Entry into the territories of the Contract-
ing Parties must be refused to any alien who does not possess com-
plete and valid documents. lIo The only exception to this rule is that 
a Contracting Party may admit an alien "on humanitarian grounds 
or in the national interest or because of international obligations."lll 
In such cases, however, entry and residence rights are limited to the 
territory of the Contracting Party concerned.112 Visas for visits of 
more than three months, however, "shall be national visas issued by 
one of the Contracting Parties in accordance with its own legisla-
tion. "113 Thus, immigration policy should, under Schengen, remain 
fundamentally an attribute of national sovereignty. There are, how-
ever, important limitations. For example, an alien holding a resi-
dence permit issued by a Contracting Party may move "freely for up 
to three months within the territories of the other Contracting 
Parties. . .. "114 
Perhaps the most controversial, and ultimately the most sig-
nificant, aspects of the Schengen Convention concern applicants for 
asylum. Article 5(2) contains an express exception to the non-entry 
for aliens rule for "the application of special provisions concerning 
the right of asylum. "115 Article 23(5), which deals with the movement 
of aliens generally, restricts the right of the Contracting Parties to 
expel an alien by express reference to the Geneva Convention, as 
amended by the New York Protocol. ll6 Further, Article 28 reaffirms 
the commitment of the Parties not only to the Geneva Convention 
and New York Protocol but to cooperation with the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees. ll7 The Convention specifically 
requires the parties to "process any application for asylum lodged 
by an alien within the territory of anyone of them. "118 
The Convention, however, also makes abundantly clear that no 
109 [d. tit. II, ch. 2, arts. 3-5. 
110 [d. tit. II, ch. 2, art. 4. 
111 [d. tit. II, ch. 2, art. 5(2). 
112 [d. 
113 [d. tit. II, ch. 3, art. 18(2). 
114 [d. tit. II, ch. 4, art. 21 (1). 
115 [d. tit. II, ch. 2, art. 5(2). 
116 [d. tit. II, ch. 7, art. 28; Geneva Convention, supra note 78; New York Protocol, supra 
note 79. 
117 Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 6, tit II, ch. 7, art. 28. 
118 [d. tit. II, ch. 7, art. 29(1). 
1993] GERMAN IMMIGRATION 217 
Contracting Party is obligated "to authorize every applicant for asy-
lum to enter or to remain within its territory."1l9 From the German 
perspective, this is perhaps the most important asylum provision in 
the Convention as it directly contradicts the whole underpinning of 
Article 16(2) as linked with Article 19(4) of the Basic Law120 which, 
taken together, have required a right of entry and judicial review. 121 
Further, notwithstanding the general commitment to the Geneva 
Convention, "[e]very Contracting Party shall retain the right to 
refuse entry or to expel any applicant for asylum to a Third State 
on the basis of its national provisions and in accordance with its 
international commitments. "122 While this is merely a reaffirmation 
of the national right under the Geneva Convention to decide asylum 
claims, the retention of a right to expel would seem somewhat 
problematic under the non-refoulement prohibitions of Article 33 
of the Convention.123 
As to the actual processing of asylum cases, the Convention man-
dates that it shall be primarily the responsibility either of the State 
which may have issued the applicant a visa or residence permit, or, 
if the applicant seeks entry without a visa (as most do), the State 
into which the applicant seeks entry.124 The Parties are to decide, "as 
quickly as possible," which of them is responsible for the processing 
of a given asylum case. 125 In addition, subject to the above mentioned 
qualifications, processing shall be done in accordance with national 
law. 126 Meanwhile, asylum-seekers are generally not free to move 
within the Schengen countries pending a decision on their case.127 
119Id. tit. II, ch. 7, art. 29(2). 
120Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] arts. 16, 19 (F.R.G.). 
121 See Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 199. 
122 Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 6, tit. II, ch. 7, art. 29(2). 
123 Article 33 of the Geneva Convention provides: 
(1) No contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or freedom would be threat-
ened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion. 
(2) The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee 
when there are reasonable grounds for regarding him as a danger to the security of 
the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
Geneva Convention, supra note 78, art. 33. 
124Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 6, tit. II, ch. 7, art. 30. 
125Id. tit. II, ch. 7, art. 31 (1). 
126Id. tit. II, ch. 7, art. 32. 
127Id. tit. II, ch. 7, art. 33(1). 
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Furthermore, relevant to current German practice, an asylum-seeker 
whose case has been denied may be granted permission to remain 
in the territory of the state which denied the claim (on humanitar-
ian grounds, for example) but will be returned to that state if found 
within the territory of any other Party.128 
In addition to the harmonization of current procedures, the Con-
vention requires reciprocal notification among the Parties of any 
material changes to their asylum laws.129 Further, the Parties "guar-
antee close co-operation in the collection of information on the 
situation in the countries of origin of applicants for asylum with a 
view to reaching a common assessment. "130 As to particular cases, 
each Party must also send to any other Party information in its 
possession that is necessary either to determine the Party responsi-
ble for deciding the case or to decide the case itself. 131 
The Dublin Convention deals exclusively with the examination of 
asylum claims and has been signed by all of the Schengen parties 
and is generally regarded as a complement to the Schengen sys-
tem.132 Like the Schengen Agreement and Convention, it contains 
no substantive harmonized rules for asylum applications. The Dub-
lin Convention does, however, contain provisions designed to guar-
antee that asylum decisions will be made by only one state. 133 As with 
the Schengen Convention, rather explicit rules are designed to 
determine exactly which state shall be responsible for deciding the 
asylum case, the main factors being whether the state has granted 
the applicant a visa or a residence permit and whether the applicant 
resides in the territory of a particular state.134 
One of the most important aspects of both the Schengen and 
Dublin Conventions is their common principle that states can legiti-
mately rely upon each other's asylum decisions. 135 As noted above, 
this aspiration raises legal difficulties as to the states' obligations 
under Article 33 of the Geneva Convention. In addition, the har-
monization of national asylum laws involves a wide variety of proce-
dural and substantive questions. In Germany, for example, the most 
128 [d. tit II, ch. 7, art. 34. 
129 !d. tit. II, ch. 7, art. 37 (l). 
130 [d. tit. II, ch. 7, art. 37 (2). 
131 See id. 
132 Hailbronner & Polakiewicz, supra note 3, at 61. 
133Dublin Convention, supra note 5, art. 3(2). 
134 [d. arts. 4-8. 
135 See Commission Report onlmmigration Law, supra note 87, at 5. 
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important issue is probably that of judicial review and entry rights, 
though this seems destined for change soon. 136 
Beyond the objections raised by other Member States, Germany 
has faced significant legal impediments to a fully harmonized asylum 
regime. Most significant, of course, is the relationship between such 
proposals and Article 16(2) of the Basic Law. Because Article 16(2) 
has engendered an asylum system that is substantially more liberal 
than that of most other EC states, the German government has 
argued that constitutional changes are necessary137 to ensure that 
Germany is not flooded by asylum-seekers who have been denied 
136 A draft Convention on the Crossing of External Frontiers also provides mechanisms for 
external border controls and the harmonization of visa policies. However, primarily due to a 
dispute between the United Kingdom and Spain over Gibraltar, the Convention has not been 
signed. David Bachan, European Freedom of Mauement May End at Dauer: Britain's Row With 
Its EC Partners on Border Controls, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 1992, at 2. 
137 See BT-Dr 12/2112 (stating the position of the CDU/CSU that a constitntional change 
must accompany the ratification of the Schengen Agreement) cited in Victor Pfaff, Flucht und 
Einwanderung: Die Nation im Umgang mit Fremden, 25 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 129, 133 (1992). 
As a matter of internal German law, the acceptance of European initiatives on immigration 
will be facilitated by recently approved amendments to the Basic Law. 
On 2 December 1992 the Bundestag adopted several amendments to the Basic Law 
in connection with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. A new Article 23 is to 
be included, the previous one had been repealed by the Unification Treaty of 31 
August 1990. The text of the new article, commonly referred to as the "Article on 
European Union," reads as follows: 
(1) With a view to establishing a united Europe the Federal Republic of Germany 
shall participate in the development of the European Union, which is committed to 
democratic, rule-of-law, social and federal principles as well as the principle of 
subsidiarity, and ensures protection of basic rights comparable in substance to that 
afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign powers 
by law with the consent of the Bundesrat. The establishment of the European Union 
as well as amendments to its statntory foundations and comparable regulations which 
amend or supplement the content of this Basic Law or make such amendments or 
supplements possible shall be subject to the provisions of the paragraphs (2) and 
(3) of Article 79. 
(Those paragraphs read as follows: '(2) Such law must be carried by two thirds of 
the members of the Bundestag and two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat. (3) 
Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the federation into Laender, 
their participation in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Article 1 
and 20 shall be prohibited.') 
(2) The Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, the Laender shall be involved in 
matters concerning the European Union. The Federal Government shall inform the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat comprehensively and as quickly as possible. 
(3) The Federal Government shall give the Bundestag the opportunity to state its 
opinion before participating in the legislative process of the European Union. The 
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Federal Government shall take account of the opmIOn of the Bundestag in the 
negotiations. Details shall be the subject of a law. 
(4) The Bundesrat shall be involved in the decision-making process of the Federation 
in so far as it would have to be involved in a corresponding internal measure or in 
so far as the Laender would be internally responsible. 
(5) Where in an area in which the Federation has exclusive legislative jurisdiction 
the interests of the Laender are affected or where in other respects the Federation 
has the right to legislate, the Federal Government shall take into account the opinion 
of the Bundesrat. Where essentially the legislative powers of the Laender, the estab-
lishment of their authorities or their administrative procedures are affected, the 
opinion of the Bundesrat shall be given due consideration in the decision-making 
process of the Federation; in this connection the responsibility of the Federation for 
the country as a whole shall be maintained. In matters which may lead to expendi-
ture increases or revenue cuts for the Federation, the approval of the Federal 
Government shall be necessary. 
(6) Where essentially the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Laender is affected 
the exercise of the rights of the Federal Republic of Germany as a member state of 
the European Union shall be transferred by the Federation to a representative of 
the Laender designated by the Bundesrat. Those rights shall be exercised with the 
participation of and in agreement with the Federal Government; in this connection 
the responsibility of the Federation for the country as a whole shall be maintained. 
(7) Details regarding paragraphs (4) to (6) shall be the subject of a law which shall 
require the consent of the Bundesrat. 
The following paragraph (la) shall be inserted after paragraph (1) of Article 24: 
(1a) Where the Laender have the right to exercise sovereign powers and perform 
sovereign tasks they may with the consent of the Federal Government transfer 
sovereign rights to transfrontier institutions in neighbouring regions. 
The following sentence shall be inserted after Article 28, paragraph (1), first sen-
tence: 
In county and municipal elections persons who are nationals of member states of 
the European Community, too, may vote and shall be eligible for elections in 
accordance with European Community law. 
Article 45 has been reinstated with the following wording (the previous Article 45 
concerning the status of Bundestag committees having been repealed in 1976): The 
Bundestag shall appoint a Committee on European Union. It may empower the 
Committee to exercise the Bundestag's rights in relation to the Federal Government 
in accordance with Article 23. 
Article 50 (,The Laender shall participate through the Bundesrat in the legislative 
process and administration of the Federation') shall now read: 
The Laender shall participate through the Bundesrat in the legislative process and 
administration of the Federation and in matters concerning the European Union. 
Doc. 4062e/0-2812 (provided by German Information Center and on file with author). 
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elsewhere. 13s Thus, current legislative attention in Germany has fo-
cused on the development of lists of "safe countries" in which there 
is presumed to be no persecution. 139 Most of eastern Europe will 
surely be included, along with all EC states, Austria, Poland, Switzer-
land, and the Czech Republic. 140 These unilateral measures clearly 
would de-liberalize the German asylum system. Nevertheless, at pre-
sent, the concern over divergent asylum standards remains a serious 
one. 
D. The Effect of the Schengen and Dublin Harmonization Measures 
Neither the Schengen Agreement nor the Dublin Convention 
expressly requires multilateral deference to one party's asylum deci-
sion. l41 The Dublin Convention does indicate that the decision of 
one party to decide an asylum case must be recognized by the others 
and that multiple asylum applications are to be avoided.142 The EC 
Commission took the position, in its 1991 Report on Asylum143 that 
this duty of recognition meant that no Member State could rely 
upon a reservation to its own national law in this regard. 144 Thus, an 
asylum-seeker who was denied, for example, in France could not 
make a constitutional claim under German law for a reconsideration 
of his asylum case. Clearly, however, such a regime would raise 
serious constitutional questions in Germany. 
Perhaps the most fundamental impediment to European har-
monization of asylum policy is the basic definitional question of who 
is even eligible for asylum. Neither the Dublin Convention nor the 
Schengen Agreements define the term "refugee." Both simply rely 
upon the definition contained within the Geneva Convention.145 
Similarly, the Maastricht Treaty, to the extent that it deals with the 
issue at all, defers to the Geneva Convention and the European 
138 Huber, supra note 63, at 620. These fears, however, are questionable. It appears, for 
example, that only some 10-15 percent of the asylum-seekers in other Schengen countries 
travel to Germany. Further, it is unknown how many of these individuals have previously 
applied for asylum elsewhere. [d. at 621. 
139 See Doc. 4062e/0-2812, supra note 137. 
14Q See Bundestag (Again) Debates Proposed New Laws on Foreigners and Asylum-seekers; Ma-
jority Support Likely, THE WEEK IN GERMANY, Mar. 5, 1993, at 1. 
141 See Dublin Convention, supra note 5, art. 15(3); Schengen Agreement and Convention, 
supra note 6, art. 38(3). 
142 See Dublin Convention, supra note 5, art. 3. 
143 See generally Commission Report on Immigration Law, supra note 87. 
144 [d. 
145 See Dublin Convention, supra note 5, art. 2; Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra 
note 6, art. 28. 
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Human Rights Convention.146 The Commission, in October 1991, 
recognized the critical importance of achieving a common defini-
tion of the term "refugee" throughout the EC. 147 Nonetheless, agree-
ment upon the language of the Geneva Convention does not accom-
plish this goal. For one thing, many EC states now recognize large 
numbers of so-called de facto or humanitarian refugees who do not 
fit within the Geneva Convention definition.148 Many human rights 
experts are concerned that pressures to adopt a harmonized refugee 
definition will result in many fewer protections for de facto refu-
gees. 149 The Convention, moreover, does not require the grant of 
asylum to a refugee. It only mandates that a refugee not be sent back 
to a place where he or she would have a well-founded fear of perse-
cution. 150 Thus, under current asylum practice, wide differences 
exist among Member States even though they are all bound by the 
Convention's definitions. The questions of post-flight grounds for 
asylum, and the consequences of residence in another state were 
noted by the Commission as important differences of this kind.l5l 
Moreover, asylum adjudication is notoriously political and gener-
ally subjective. In the mid-1980's, for instance, some 90 percent of 
Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka were recognized in Denmark.152 Dur-
ing the same period in Germany, however, the figures for Tamil 
refugees were 8 percent for 1984, 37 percent for 1985, and 20 
percent for 1986.153 Figures such as these provide powerful empirical 
support for the proposition that states presently do not interpret the 
Convention in the same way. It is even arguable that such a central-
ized substantive coordination of asylum practice is inherently impos-
sible given the nature of asylum adjudication. By way of comparison 
to U.S. practice, it is important to note that vast differences exist 
among different immigration judges, between the immigration 
judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and among the 
various Circuit Courts that review decisions of the Board.154 Attempts 
146 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 9, tit. VI, art. K.2(1). 
147 Commission Report on Immigration Law, supra note 87, at 6. 
148 See O'Keefe, supra note 64, at 14. 
149 Id.; see generally Gil Loescher, The Single European Market and the European Community s 
Asylum Policy, 13-14 (published as part of the International Conference, Refugees in the 
World: The European Community's Response, at Hague 7-8 Dec. 1989). 
150 Geneva Convention, supra notes 78 and 123, art. 33 (so-called right of non-refoulement). 
151 Commission Report on Immigration Law, supra note 87, at 6. 
152Huber, supra note 63, at 621. 
153Id. 
154 See generally Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case 
Study on the Implementation oj Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 433 (1992). 
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by the Supreme Court and the Board to standardize asylum practice 
within the United States have been strikingly ineffective.155 This is 
not to say that the goal of a standardized system is necessarily 
impossible. But it is difficult to imagine a point in the foreseeable 
future when the adjudications of, say, Germany and France, will be 
more similar than those of the Ninth and First Circuit Courts of 
Appeal in the United States. The difference, of course, is that denied 
asylum-seekers in Boston cannot travel to California for a second 
hearing. Thus, attention in the EC has focused not only upon defini-
tional harmony, (which clearly would require either a dramatic 
change of national attitudes or an unprecedented cession of na-
tional authority), but upon procedural solutions to the problem of 
multiple applications. Following the suggestions of one German 
commentator,156 three basic models are possible: 
1. A denied asylum-seeker could, as is presently true, retain the 
right to enter another EC state and apply again for asylum there. 
Such a request would be de novo and would be determined by the 
positive law of the state, as well as its interpretations of the require-
ments of the Geneva Convention and other provisions of interna-
tionallaw. 
2. EC states can develop a common policy and system for the 
definition, admission, and processing of asylum-seekers. Such a so-
lution would, as noted, require an unprecedented cession of sover-
eign powers relating to border control, judicial review, etc. Suffice 
to say that this model does not appear to be achievable within the 
foreseeable future. 
3. The signatory states can each agree to admit asylum-seekers as 
they apply at the borders of each state. The state of entry would then 
adjudicate the asylum claim under more or less common standards 
(e.g., the Geneva Convention). The results of the state's decision, 
whether positive or negative, would then be recognized by all of the 
other parties. One problem with this solution on the formal legal 
level, at least as to denied applications, is that it would seem to 
conflict with the requirement of the Geneva Convention that each 
state adjudicate asylum applications on its own.157 
155 See generally David Martin, Refarming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of 
Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1247,1294-337 (1990). 
156 See Huber, supra note 63, at 622. 
157 In 1978, the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees expressly stated that a negative decision by one state on any asylum claim should not 
hinder the adjudication by another state of that claim. [d. at 622 n.55 (citing Decision No. 12 
(XIX) (1978». 
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Beyond the general questions of definitional and admissions poli-
cies, harmonization of asylum practice raises special administrative 
and legal problems for Germany. The EC Commission, in addition 
to calling for a common admission practice, recognized the critical 
importance of developing common adjudicatory procedures for asy-
lum-seekers.158 The Geneva Convention, however, contains no such 
rules. Thus, at present, procedures are governed for the most part 
by national law. Most Member States, moreover, view the matter as 
one of governmental discretion subject to rather limited judicial 
review. Indeed, Germany is unique in its incorporation of asylum 
questions into its system of constitutional law subject to extensive 
judicial review. 159 Although some right to review of a denied asylum 
claim is generally available throughout the EC (but not in Ireland, 
Italy, and Portugal),160 Germany's system is uniquely protective of 
the procedural legal rights of asylum-seekers.161 Spain, for example, 
allows administrative review of decisions denying an asylum-seeker 
the right to enter, but not of the substantive denial of the claim 
itself. 162 
These differences in administrative and legal practice could pre-
sent formidable obstacles to multilateral acceptance of each state's 
asylum decisions. The French administrative legal system, which has 
strongly influenced that of Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and Italy, provides a much more limited form of review than the 
German system.163 The difference is important; the French system 
essentially requires a claim by the denied applicant that the decision 
is a nullity, while the German system offers a substantive review of 
the decision.164 As one German commentator has noted, the two 
systems seem to be virtually impossible to reconcile. 165 The most 
likely possibility for harmonization, then, would require a radical 
change in the German system-a considerable retrenchment on 
legal protections for asylum-seekers with important political and 
social resonance beyond its specific legal effects. 166 More specifically, 
harmonization of administrative practice in this regard would re-
158 Commission Report on Immigration Law, supra note 87, app. 18. 
159 See Huber, supra note 63, at 622. 
160 !d. 
161 See Kanstroom, supra note 1, at discussion Part 1. 
162Id. 
163 See Huber, supra note 63, at 622. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 See Kanstroom, supra note 1, at discussion Part 1. 
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quire not merely an amendment to Article 16(2),167 but a substantial 
change in Article 19(4) of the Basic Law as well. 168 Unfortunately, 
this seems to be the very direction in which Germany is headed. 
III. IMMIGRATION, NATIONALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
As noted, a wide variety of multilateral European ImtIatives on 
citizenship, immigration, and asylum have recently been considered 
if not fully undertaken. These measures have already affected, and 
will continue to affect the law of Germany and other Member States. 
This is particularly clear in the case of German asylum law. The move 
toward a sort of EC citizenship could also mitigate significantly the 
importance of Germany's restrictive approach to ascriptive citizen-
ship and naturalization.169 It is therefore important to consider the 
more general politico-legal impact of multilateral asylum and immi-
gration initiatives on German and European nationalism, especially 
as that concept is mediated by laws of citizenship. 
A. Nationalism and Citizenship Law 
The loathsome mask has fallen, the man remains, Sceptreless, 
free, uncircumscribed, but man, Equal, unclassed, tribeless and 
nationless. 170 
l. Nationalism and Immigration 
The term "nationalism" is used to describe a range of behaviors 
and attitudes from "ethnic cleansing" to violent attacks on foreigners 
in western Europe to strict border control measures. I71 This broad 
167 Even if Article 16(2) were removed entirely from the Basic Law, German law mandates 
procedural protections based upon German interpretations of Article 13 of the European 
Human Rights Convention. Huber, supra note 63, at 623. 
!tiS [d. 
169 See Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 172-78. 
170 PERCY BYSSHE Shelley, Prometheus Unbound, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF 
PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY 277 (Cambridge ed. 1901). 
171 As to the two European conceptions of the state-that derived from Locke and Rous-
seau-see Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 160 n.35. 
As to the state itself, the difference between the two traditions is essentially that between a 
skeleton and a living organism. More fully developed by Kant, Hegel, and Marx, the distinc-
tively German line of this thought sees the individual as rather more fundamentally situated 
in the state. Attempts to separate the public and private realm are critiqued as both impossible 
and, at least by Marx, as dishonest. See generally KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (Frederick Engels ed., 1967). ''The state," wrote Hegel, "is the actuality 
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usage raises obvious questions about the utility of the terminology. 
Nationalism, at bottom, means only that a connection has been 
made between the "nation" and the state. Political legitimacy in 
post-war Western Europe depends, in large measure, upon the main-
tenance of a relatively pluralistic (i.e., non-ethnic, non-racial) idea 
of the nation. But nationalism tends to have pejorative, ethnic/racial 
connotations. The current utility of the category "nationalism" in 
the context of citizenship and immigration questions is therefore 
not clear. 
Modern nationalism, as it developed from the writings of Montes-
quieu and Rousseau, identified the "nation" with a "people" and 
became a central tenet of both the French and, to a lesser extent, 
the American Revolutions. 172 Early nationalism, however, was pro-
foundly democratic and only implicitly racial or ethnic. 173 Genera-
tions of writers, following the early inquiries of Renan, 174 have sough t 
to achieve a unified field theory of nationalism. One problem is the 
absence of a true literature of nationalism analogous to that of 
Marxism, for example. A category of thought sufficiently broad to 
accommodate Schiller, Mazzini, Toussaint L'Ouverture, Hitler, Boli-
var, Sukarno, Emperor Hirohito, Nasser, Arafat, and Begin (to name 
of human freedom." GEORG W. FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
282 (Allen W. Wood ed. & H. B. Nisbet trans., 1991). Underlying this more "organic" view of 
the state, which does seem to have some similarities to the Athenian conception of the "polis" 
and American "civic Republicanism" we sometimes find a more problematic idea-the "Volk." 
As Hegel put it in his inimitable way: "spirit is actual only as that which it knows itself to be, 
and ... the state, as the spirit ofa nation ['Volk'], is both the law which permeates all relations 
within it and also the customs and consciousness of the individuals who belong to it ..... " 
Id. at 312 (emphasis in original); see also DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL]URIS-
PRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REpUBLIC OF GERMANY 39 (1989) (citing]oHN GREVILLE POCOCK, 
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); GARY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALISTS 
(1980); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969)). 
Modern Germany adopted elements of both state traditions. The Hegelian view is clearly 
not the dominant one. But, to a much greater extent than in Great Britain or the United 
States, German law consciously adopts particular social values, embodies a much more pater-
nalistic conception of state duties, and tends towards a more closed perception of the polity. 
See Kanstroom, supra note I, at 167-72. On the other hand, however, West Germany (pre-
unification) was often described as a weak "state," at least in the centralized national sense. 
The reasons for this included West Germany's strong Federalism, lack of a historical center 
(Berlin), general "dependent sovereignty" within NATO and the Western Alliance generally, 
and, of course, the basic division of the pre-War state into the Bundesrepublik and the GDR. 
172 See generally EDWARD HALLETT CARR, NATIONALISM AND AFTER (1945). 
173The idea of distinctive national character, however, was quite common among late 
eighteenth century writers. See, e.g., Emmanuel Kant, The Sense oj the Beautiful and the Sublime, 
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT (Carl]. Friedrich ed,. 1949). 
174 Ernest Renan, What Is A Nation?, reprinted in NATION AND NARRATION (Hornik Bhabha 
ed., 1990). 
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just a few) surely begins to appear too general to be useful. Some 
well-known, meticulous writers have labored to distinguish various 
sub-categories of nationalism in order to avoid this very problem.175 
On the most functional level, one might start with Ernest Gellner's 
recent attempt (accepted in substance by Eric Hobsbawm): "Nation-
alism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political 
and the national unit should be congruent."176 This definition has 
several virtues. First, it avoids the hypostatizing or "reification" of the 
"nation" as a starting point. This is a problem with much of the older 
literature on the subject. Renan, for instance, concludes in his fa-
mous essay, Mat Is A Nation? that "a nation is a soul, a spiritual 
principle .... "177 The more modern view, however, is that "for the 
purposes of analysis nationalism comes before nations."178 
This view of the nation as an "imagined community"179 and na-
tionalism as its theory oflegitimacy obviously facilitates a much more 
nuanced analysis. Consider, by contrast, the alternative more circu-
lar approach: "the best definition of a nation is a nationality that has 
achieved an independent political existence. "180 It is not coincidental 
that Fairchild's methodology accompanied the normative view that 
the United States, is, always has been, and should continue to be "a 
white man's country."181 Beyond race, in fact, he offered the follow-
ing incredible partial list of traits "essential to Americanism: ... such 
things as business honesty, respect for womanhood, inventiveness, 
political independence, physical cleanliness, good sportsman-
175 See, e.g., ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 88-99 (1983) ("a typology of 
nationalisms"); ERIC JOHN HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 178046 (1991) 
("popular proto-nationalism"). Still, the question remains whether there is a lowest common 
denominator of nationalism which can be used to place the German variant in a broader 
context. 
176 GELLNER, supra note 175, at 1; HOBSBAWM, supra note 175, at 9. Hobsbawm adds that 
nationalism implies that the obligations of nationals ["Ruritanians" per Gellner] override "all 
other public obligations, and in extreme cases [such as wars] all other obligations of whatever 
kind. HOBSBAWM, supra note 175, at 9. 
177Renan, supra note 174, at 9. Stalin wrote, somewhat more cautiously, in 1912 that "[a] 
nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and 
psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture." JOSEPH STALIN, MARXISM AND 
THE NATIONAL QUESTION 8 (1942), quoted in HOBSBAWM, supra note 175, at 5 n.8. As Gellner 
correctly notes, however, "[n]ations as a natural, God-given way of classifYing men ... are a 
myth." GELLNER, supra note 175, at 48-49. 
178HoBSBAWM, supra note 175, at 10. 
179 See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6 (1991). "Communities are to be 
distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined." 
Id. 
180 HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD, THE MELTING POT MISTAKE 52 (1926). 
181Id. at 129. 
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ship .... "182 Fortunately, no one has yet suggested making the lack 
of these traits bases for deportation from the United States. 
There are two very different modern uses of the term "national-
ism." This is the distinction between what might be termed "patri-
otic" and "volkisch" nationalism. The first is that of "[ t] he revolution-
ary concept of the nation as constituted by the deliberate political 
option of its potential citizens .... "183 It is classically represented by 
revolutionary France and the United States. The second, "volkisch" 
variant of "nationalism" is that which relates to a national myth that 
is largely defined by race, blood, or ethnicity.184 
It is important to avoid too general a definition of nationalism. 185 
First, any formulation of the term is "parasitic" on definitions of two 
other terms-"state" and "nation." These terms themselves reflect 
very different ideas in at least two distinct major traditions. Consider 
the immense variability even among the four most rudimentary 
possibilities: the night-watchman state, the Rousseau-Hegelian-Marx-
ist (corporativist) state, the volkisch nation, and the nation based on 
political or economic principles or ideology. Nazi Germany repre-
sented the worst possibilities of the combination of the second and 
third principles, the German Democratic Republic represented the 
second and fourth. The new Germany remains a fascinating and 
complex mix of all four. 186 
What then might EC nationalism now mean? Here we must again 
consider the effects of immigration on what Sally Falk Moore has 
called the "process of cultural pluralism. "187 Large-scale movements 
182 [d. at 202. 
183Hobsbawrn, supra note 175, at 88. 
184The term "ethnic" straddles the line between race and culture. Ethnicity evokes very 
similar ideas to those involved with the term "Volk" or "people," the predicate conception for 
volkisch nationalism. Thus, the volkisch conception of the nation involves the belief in legiti-
mate, strong ties of both blood and culture. 
185 Gellner is correct to define nationalism as "primarily" a political principle because it is 
clearly related to basic human desires for community. We gain little if any analytical clarity by 
simply defining it as the apotheosis of that urge. Gellner seems to recognize this point in his 
strangely defensive conclusion under the heading "What is not being said." GELLNER, supra 
note 175, at 137. And yet, were we to define nationalism as purely a political principle (like 
the right to vote) we would risk losing sight of its considerable potential emotional power. 
This is not to say that the "political" and the "irrational" are exclusive categories. No honest 
observer of modern politics could sustain such a view. But it is possible to distinguish ideas 
that make overt appeals to pre-rational bases like blood, land, or race from those that do not. 
The term "political" seems to have this implication for Gellner, although it is hard to be certain 
about this. 
186 See generally Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 164-72. 
187 See generally Sally Falk Moore, The Production of Cultural Pluralism as a Process, 1 PUB. 
CULTURE 26 (1989). 
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of people across the boundaries of nation-states have contradictory 
effects. In some cases, like that of the United States now, waves of 
immigration, especially if they are illegal under positive domestic 
law, may lead to an increasingly rigid conception of borders and 
sovereignty. Current proposals to build a huge fence or trench along 
the thousand-mile border with Mexico illustrate the high (or low) 
point of this mode of thought. Similarly, the idea that Haitian asy-
lum-seekers may be interdicted in the Caribbean so that they achieve 
no rights under U.S. law represents a rather brittle (and inhumane) 
idea of natural boundaries. Movements of people across borders, 
however, also sometimes force reconceptualization of the nation-
state itself. The repatriation of ethnic Germans, for example, con-
tinually emphasized the nation against the state. It should be appar-
ent, then, that modern discussions of nationalism in the context of 
immigration inevitably involve not only the vagaries of the first term, 
but a necessity of understanding the linkage among the prevailing 
nationalist ideology and the legal! political conception of immigra-
tion and citizenship. Consider Gellner's use of the term "congruent" 
in his definition of nationalism. "Congruence" is not really the goal 
of nationalism so much as dominance. Thus, the nationalist princi-
ple is not violated by the presence of "small numbers of resident 
foreigners."188 But the key word is "small." This distinction, between 
congruence and dominance, is particularly important when one 
tries to reconcile nationalist ideas within an existing state like Ger-
many with liberal principles like basic human rights, the rule of law, 
etc. This, again, is the basic German and indeed the western Euro-
pean dilemma. 189 
As the current German situation demonstrates, then, another 
critical term today in ostensibly "nationalist" rhetoric is "foreigners." 
188 GELLNER, supra note 175, at 2. 
189 It must also be noted that the attentions ofthose whom we may call modern "nationalists" 
are not exclusively focused on the "political" unit. Non-citizen aliens are not generally a 
significant political force. They may, however, be extremely important economically and 
socially. "America First" nationalists in Detroit are not concerned that Japan is taking over 
America's political system. Street battles in Brooklyn between African-American activists and 
Korean green-grocers are not about political power. They do, however, seem to be about more 
than race, often involving what might be described as nationalist rhetoric ("This is our 
country. They are foreigners."). And applicants for asylum in Europe and the United States 
are (both per the Geneva Refugee Convention and in the popular imagination) divided 
between legitimate political refugees and unacceptable "economic" ones. For an interesting 
analysis in English of the German debate over whether foreigners should be allowed to vote 
see Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the People": Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 
13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992). 
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The primary victims of nationalist violence in the industrial states 
of Europe and North America now are the huge numbers of resident 
"foreigners. "190 This fact forces us to confront the critical role played 
by law in the internaP91 nationalism we see today. The variety of 
nationalism which we see throughout Europe today is better defined 
as primarily a political principle which holds that "foreigners," a 
category of people defined by law, have (or should have) no right 
under law to become citizens or to challenge the economic, political, 
and cultural dominance of citizen/nationals. 
Those who desire to give priority to citizens as such, of course, are 
not necessarily either volkisch nationalists, racists, or even mono-cul-
turalists. Many Germans, for example, simply argue that "foreigners" 
are taking advantage of a society which should legitimately care most 
for its citizens. This attitude, absent more, might be termed "citizen 
exclusivism." It is not at all synonymous with volkisch nationalism, 
and indeed is closer to the heart of patriotic nationalism.192 To 
understand its full resonance, however, we must consider what it 
means to be a citizen of either Germany or, more broadly, of the 
European Community. 
190 Unfortunately, we also see a resurgence of more classical ethnic nationalism in much of 
Eastern Europe. During a speech at Harvard Law School, Professor Roger Fisher reported 
that a Latvian politician informed him that Latvia had a unique "minority" problem because 
75 percent of its population was ethnically Russian and it was difficult to deal with a 75 percent 
minority! 
191 "Internal" means not only the nation-state, but the EC as well, insofar as it defines itself 
as an entity with external borders. 
1925imilarly, the invocation of equally complex terms like racism or monoculturalism to 
describe anti-foreigner attitudes must be qualified. Racism, like nationalism, is best defined 
without the presumption that races exist. Benedict Anderson offers a particularly useful and 
eloquent distinction of the two concepts: 
The fact of the matter is that nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while 
racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time 
through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations ... (Thus for the Nazi, the 
Jewish German was always an imposter.) The dreams of racism actually have their 
origins in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to 
divinity among rulers and to 'blue' or 'white' blood and 'breeding' among aristoc-
racies. No surprise then that the putative sire of modern racism should be, not some 
petty-bourgeois nationalist, but Joseph Arthur, Comte de Gobineau. 
ANDERSON, supra note 179, at 149 (footnotes omitted). 
Culture is no less difficult to define than nation and equally subject to being viewed 
monolithically. Doing so, however, invariably leads to normative conclusions about the justice 
of excluding foreign cultural tendencies. If, on the other hand, culture is seen more as "an 
assemblage of separable parts," Moore, supra note 187, at 38, then a more fluid political theory 
can be achieved. It follows that those who support highly restrictive immigration policies tend 
towards more systematized and static definitions of culture. 
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2. Citizenship 
If comparative or cross-cultural studies of citizenship prove one 
thing, it is the astonishing range of concepts that may be subsumed 
under this one linguistic heading. At its most basic level, citizenship 
might be described as "the special status that the law of a particular 
state accords an individual by virtue of his [or her] connection with 
that state."193 Beyond this most general level, however, citizenship 
becomes a highly ambiguous idea. 
Language itself reflects this ambiguity. In France, the term "na-
tionalite" has been used to express membership in the nation-state 
since the 1789 Revolution. Because the patriotic-nationalist idea is 
consistent with this technical usage, the term could simultaneously 
express a socio-political ideal and nation-state membership without 
engendering cognitive dissonance. Americans generally speak of 
citizenship law, though the term nationality is also used, as it is in 
the United Kingdom. But "nationals," under American law, are a 
broader category of persons than citizens. This has no clear link to 
nationalism as an ideology, however, and derives more from the 
historically unique desire to distinguish citizens from non-citizen 
"nationals" who did not have full political rights but were more than 
permanent resident aliens. 194 German law generally uses the term 
"Staatsangehorigkeit," which literally translates as "state member-
ship." The German term "Burger," which is etymologically related 
to citizen, is also sometimes used, preceded by "Staats," to describe 
national citizenship as well. But the most prevalent German legal 
usage is "Angehorigkeit" or "membership." These linguistic differ-
193 Anderson C. Evans, European Citizenship: A Novel Concept in EEC Law, 32 AM. J. COMPo 
L. 679, 679 (1984) (citing OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 644-45 (8th ed. 1955)) [herein-
after European CitizenshiP]. Considerable theoretical debate has centered on whether the 
emphasis in this definition should be on the term "status," which might be linked to a "rights" 
perspective, or on the "relational" aspect of the "connection." Most modern writers tend to 
emphasize the latter. As Alex Aleinikoff put it: "Citizenship is not a right held against the state; 
it is a relationship with the state or, perhaps, a relationship among persons in the state. It is 
membership in a common venture." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 
84 MICH. L. REv. 1471,1488 (1985-86). Similarly, one leading German authority, incorporat-
ing both terms, writes that citizenship is: "ein Rechtsverhii.ltnis zwischen dem Staat und sein 
Angehorigen . . . bei dessen Regelung die Eigenschaft der Person als Subjekt dieses 
Rechtsverhii.ltnisses einen rechtlichen Status dieser Person bildet" ("a legal relationship be-
tween the state and its members by whose regulation the attribute of the person as a subject 
of this legal relationship shapes a legal status"). See GERARD-RENE DE GROOT, STAATSANGE-
HORIGKEITSRECHT 1M WANDEL 12 (Carl Heymans Verlag: Koln 1989) (quoting Alexander N. 
Makarov, Allgemeine Lehren at 27, 28). 
194 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § llOI(a)(21),(22) (1987) (defining "national" and "national of the 
United States"). 
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ences clearly reflect deeper underlying traditions of "state" and 
"nation," though one should not overstate the relationship between 
these themes and legal language. Convenience, historical accident, 
and other cultural factors invariably playa role. Nonetheless, the 
German linguistic concentration on membership is not surprising, 
and, as shown elsewhere,195 is consonant with the most distinctive 
features of German citizenship law. 196 When we consider the words 
used to describe citizenship, we tend to focus more on the power of 
the concept as a concept than on its function. 197 The actual content 
of these rights and duties vary tremendously among states. Indeed, 
all that is really contained in the term citizenship is the idea that 
some differentiation is made between citizens and non-citizens.198 
Recently, the concept of an ideal type of Western national citizen-
ship has been introduced alongside discussions of the "crisis of the 
nation state. "199 William Rogers Brubaker, for example, asserts that 
membership in a nation-state, and presumably in Europe, according 
to this model, "should be egalitarian, sacred, national, democratic, 
unique, and socially consequential."20o This approach, though inter-
esting, seems doomed from the start. As Brubaker correctly con-
cedes, the model is "largely vestigial" and "is riddled, moreover, with 
unresolved internal tensions."201 For what we see in all these ques-
tions of state, nation, membership, and citizenship is never the ideal 
195 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 172-84. 
196 Scholars often also distinguish among various uses of the term citizen or "Staatsange-
horigkeit" in positive law. Makarov, for example, distinguishes "general" ("Allgemein") and 
"functional" ("funktionel") usage. The former refers to the common practice of defining 
citizenship generally by statute or constitutional provision. The latter refers to the use by a 
specific law of a specific definition of "citizen" for purposes of that law. De Groot cites the 
19th century Dutch citizenship law as an example of a combination of these approaches. That 
law differentiated between "Angelegenheiten" and "offentlichen" questions. See DE GROOT, 
supra note 193, at 1 O. 
1971d. at 13. 
198 On the international level, the functionally empty shell of citizenship may have more 
common content Scholars do, in fact, often distinguish the "municipal" or "domestic" indicia 
of citizenship from the international. Thus, as one writer put it, "[f1rom the aspect of 
municipal law there is, therefore, no one concept of nationality but as many concepts as there 
are municipal laws .... " PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
239 (1979). This sort of rigid differentiation between domestic and international meanings, 
however, tends to ignore the important interpenetration of international law into domestic 
citizenship matters, an issue of increasing importance in post-1992 Europe. Fundamentally, 
however, it is clearly true that functional analyses of citizenship in the international sphere 
can more easily find common ground (diplomatic protection, extradition rights, etc.) than 
we see in comparisons among internal state policies. 
199WILLIAM ROGERS BRUBAKER, IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE 
AND NORTH AMERICA 3 (1989). 
200 See id. 
2011d. at 4. 
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but an uneasy reconciliation among quite different urges. Analysis 
therefore must be more fluid, more focused on processes of recon-
ciliation, and on what might be best termed "consonance and dis-
sonance," than on the postulation of a universal ideal type which 
inevitably subsumes the very dilemmas it purports to clarify. 
B. Is There A European Community Model Of Citizenship? 
Although, there is no universally acceptable definition of citizen-
ship, one common feature of modern citizenship law has been the 
linkage between the individual and the nation-state. The emergence 
of the EC, an entity that does not easily fit within any of the tradi-
tional categories of international law, raises obvious questions about 
how to conceive of "EC citizenship." From the very start, the propo-
nents of the EC recognized that the process depended upon a 
limitation of state sovereignty and a transfer of those rights to rela-
tively autonomous institutions over which the Member States would 
have limited power. Moreover, it became clear early on that the 
development of Community institutions and political/legal struc-
tures would have a dynamic of its own and that Community institu-
tions would have powers that no single Member State had or could 
legitimately covet. 202 
Recent developments have been sufficiently dramatic to inspire 
one commentator, Joseph Weiler, to speak of a "transformation" in 
which, among other features, "in public discourse, 'Europe' increas-
ingly means the European Community in much the same way that 
'America' means the United States. "203 Nevertheless, as Weiler notes, 
"[ t] he juxtaposition of Community/Member States is problematic. 
The concept of the Community, analogous to the concept of the 
Trinity, is simultaneously both one and many."204 This ambiguity in 
the nature of the EC both as a present reality and as an aspiration 
is perhaps most keenly felt in the area of citizenship laws. 
Citizens of Member States are direct legal subjects of EC institu-
tions. It has been generally undisputed since 1964 that Community 
law binds both the nationals of Member States and the states them-
selves.205 But EC citizenship law remains a secondary concept to 
202 SeeJ.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991). 
203Id. at 2406. 
204 Id. at 2406 n.7. 
205 See Case 6/64, Flaminco Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585. The so-called doctrine of direct 
effect permits nationals of Member States to invoke Community legal norms that are "clear, 
precise and self-sufficient" directly in national courts as well. See Weiler, supra note 202, at 
2413. 
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national citizenship. There is no EC citizenship statute, no EC in-
corporation of jus soli or jus sanguinis, and no EC naturalization 
procedures. Community citizenship follows, like Peter Pan's shadow, 
as a partly natural, partly sewn-on consequence of national citizen-
ship.206 This, of course, does not mean that the concept of EC 
citizenship is meaningless. It does, however, mean that the relation-
ship between, for example, volkisch nationalist ideas and citizenship 
has not yet been worked through on the EC level.207 
The Treaty of Rome, the founding document of the EC, did not 
employ the term "citizen." Its grant of certain rights to individuals 
was dependent entirely upon their status as "nationals of member 
states. "208 Initially these rights were those of free movement of work-
ers and entrepreneurs and freedom from discrimination.209 This 
linkage of rights to national membership does not necessarily mean 
that Member States are completely free to define such membership 
for Community purposes in any way they choose.210 Indeed, since 
terms like "worker" are Community legal terms of art, the Commu-
nity cannot logically permit Member States' definitions of "national" 
to defeat Community rules of free movement.211 
Harmonization of national citizenship laws raises daunting tech-
nical and political problems, however. The differences between jus 
soli and jus sanguinis, for example, involve not only procedures but 
historical and ideological positions that are notoriously difficult to 
reconcile. Thus, to date, the Community has not crafted any general 
rules for the granting of national membership. Beginning in the 
206 Indeed, the German situation calls this formulation into question as Germany recognizes 
a class of ethnic German non-citizens as nationalists for the purposes ofEC law. See Kanstroom, 
supra note 1, at 187--88. 
207 It is also important to note that, on the state level, "discrimination is written into the 
very nature of the European Community, which in each country directly leads to the definition 
of two categories of foreigners with unequal rights." Etienne Balibar, Es Gibt Keinen Staat in 
Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today, 186 NEW LEFT REv. 5, 6 (1991). 
208 See generally EEC TREATY, supra note 10. 
209 Articles 48-51 require freedom of movement for "workers." Articles 52 and 59-60 man-
date, respectively, freedom of movement for self-employed persons and freedom to offer 
services. Article 7 forbids discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
210The full extent to which a state may unilaterally determine who is a "national" for 
purposes of EC law is still not entirely clear. In fact, there seems to be developing a trend 
toward viewing the term "national ofa Member State" as a Community concept. Functionally, 
however, the status remains derivative from national laws even as the European Court seeks 
a common denominator. See, e.g., Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 
1219. 
211 See generally Anderson C. Evans, Nationality Law and European Integration, 16 EUR. L. 
REv. 190, 191 (1991) [hereinafter Nationality Law]. 
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mid-1970s, however, both the European Commission and the Euro-
pean Parliament had begun to consider a supra-national approach 
to EC citizenship.212 The main components of such citizenship, as 
noted above, would at least have to be rights of political participation 
on EC questions, free movement, and equality of treatment. 
When direct universal suffrage was instituted for elections to the 
European Parliament in 1976, the idea of EC citizenship became 
more understandable and gained a certain momentum.213 But Mem-
ber States remained free to prohibit resident nationals of other 
Member States from participating in such elections.214 In fact, this is 
the general practice to date.215 Participation in domestic elections is 
even more controversial. The Commission had first advocated the 
grant of such rights in 1972,216 but not until 1988 did the Commis-
sion submit a draft of a specific proposal.217 The Maastricht Treaty 
essentially adopted this proposal and now provides that Community 
citizens may run for office and vote in municipal elections in the 
Member States in which they reside. 218 Not only would this provision 
essentially overrule the decision of the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) which had denied this 
right to aliens in Germany, but it removes part of what has been 
perhaps the most important "municipal" distinction between na-
tional and EC citizenship.219 Further, in the international realm, the 
Maastricht Treaty requires Member States to offer diplomatic and 
consular protections to all EC citizens outside the Community.220 
The nascent substitution of EC citizenship as an international 
protection criterion, combined with the right to vote in local elec-
212 European Citizenship, supra note 193, at 682. 
213 Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly by Direct Universal 
Suffrage, 1976 OJ. (L 278) 5. 
214 See id., art. 7; Nationality Law, supra note 211, at 207. 
215 Nationality Law, supra note 211, at 207. 
216 [d. at 209. 
217Marcel Zwamborn, The Scope for A Refugee Policy of the European Communitites as 
Part of an Overall Human Rights Policy, 18 (published as part of the International Confer-
ence, Refugees in the World: The European Community's Response, at Hague 7-8 December 
1989). 
218 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 9, tit. II, art. G(C) (amending EEC Treaty to insert art. 
8b(i)). 
219 [d. The Maastricht Treaty does not, however, provide for voting rights in national 
elections. See id. 
220 [d. tit. II, art. G(C) (amending EEC Treaty to insert art. 8(c)). Maastricht's aspirations 
are clearly quite bold. Its second article grapples, if obliquely, with the citizenship problem as 
it speaks of "a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen." [d. tit. I, art. 2. 
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tions, can fairly be called a revolutionary change. It is thus extremely 
important that Title I of the Treaty begins with a resolution by the 
parties "to establish a citizenship common to nationals of their 
countries"221 and that Title II expressly refers to "Citizenship of the 
Union" granted to "[e]very person holding the nationality of a 
Member State .... "222 Every such citizen of the Union has, in addi-
tion to the voting rights described above, the general right "to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States."223 But 
citizenship remains derivative. By Declaration, the conferees at 
Maastricht stated: "the question whether an individual possesses the 
nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference to 
the national law of the Member State concerned. "224 
The ideological movement towards EC citizenship remains ambigu-
ous. It is significant, for example, that the Maastricht Treaty does 
not abjure the so-called "principal of subsidiarity" which essentially 
requires that decisions should be taken at the sub-Community level 
if possible.225 A nation, as Renan once observed, is not a Zollverein 
(customs union).226 And neither is the EC at this point. But it would 
be a false syllogism to move from these premises to the assertion 
that western Europe is anything close to a nation or even that EC 
citizenship has supplanted in any meaningful way the importance 
for Germans of calling themselves Germans or even of calling them-
selves citizens of Germany. In fact, the most popular current idea of 
EC community still clearly retains many important aspects of state 
sovereignty but also is premised on "recognizing, and even celebrat-
ing, the reality of interdependence, and on counterpoising to the 
exclusivist ethos of statal autonomy a notion of a community of states 
and peoples sharing values and aspirations. "227 It is not at all clear 
how far this idea can develop, though the vision of a united Europe 
in which Member States will "wither away" seems the implicit core 
of the discussion in 1992, even in 1993. Weiler, after all, did not 
221 Id. at pmbl. 
222Id. tit. II, art. G(C) (amending EEC Treaty to insert art. 8). 
223Id. tit. II, art. G(C) (amending EEC Treaty to insert art. 8(a)). 
224Id. at Text of Final Act of Conference, Declaration on Nationality of a Member State 
(emphasis added). 
225 See Commission of the European Communities: From A Single Market to European 
Union 21 (1992). Indeed, Article 3(b) of the Treaty guarantees that in areas of concurrent 
jurisdiction, like immigration, the Community will only take action if it can do so more 
effectively than the Member States. 
226 See Renan, supra note 174. 
227Weiler, supra note 202, at 2479. 
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abandon the concept of states alongside that of peoples in his 
vision. 228 
Raymond Aron long ago expressed well the strong skeptical view 
of Euro-citizenship as an idea: '" [t] he European idea [of unity] is 
empty: it has neither the transcendence of Messianic ideologies nor 
the immanence of concrete patriotism."'229 It was created by intel-
lectuals, and that accounts at once for its genuine appeal to the 
mind and its feeble echo in the heart.23o Perhaps the strongest 
response to this critique has been the neo-functionalist231 faith that 
ideas will follow functions. 232 Perhaps it is inevitable that the new 
voting and protection rights of the Maastricht Treaty will eventually 
combine with the economic union program and be transformed 
into supra-national membership ideologies centered on the new 
Euro-citizenship model. There is obvious power to this view, though 
only time will tell whether ideal form follows mundane function. But 
we should also consider, if Aron was wrong, how wrong might he 
be? Nationalism, as we have seen, developed in the nineteenth 
century either due to a powerful ethnic/racial or political/cultural 
mythology.233 Given the cultural and ethnic diversity within the EC, 
its unifying ideology seems destined either to be essentially racial or, 
most optimistically, based on something like what Almond and Verba 
once termed "civic culture."234 Will Euro-nationalists soon speak as 
Woodrow Wilson did in 1915 to a group of newly naturalized Ameri-
can citizens: 
You have just taken an oath of allegiance to the United 
States. Of allegiance to whom? Of allegiance to no one 
unless it be to God. . .. You have taken an oath of alle-
228Id. 
229 MICHAEL CURTIS, WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 7-8 (1965). 
230 Id. at 8. 
231 Functionalism in the EC context is essentially a pragmatic philosophy which rejects 
broad, Utopian visions. Its most prominent proponent was Jean Monnet who, as one com-
mentator recently put it, "was almost Anglo-Saxon in his rejection of a visionary approach to 
the development of the Community." Peter D. Sutherland, Joining the Threads: The Influence 
Creating a Eurapean Union, in CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
AND NATIONAL LAW 11, 13 (Dierdre Curtin & David O'Keefe eds., 1992). 
232 See, e.g., HARRISON, EUROPE IN QUESTION 27-31 (1974). 
233 Is it possible to agree with Rosa Luxemburg that "[t]he national question is, for Social 
Democracy, exactly like all other societal and political questions, above all a question of class 
interests[?]" ROSA LUXEMBURG, INTERNATIONALISMUS UND KLASSENKAMPF. DIE POLNISCHEN 
SCHRIFTEN 260 (Neuwied: 1971), quoted in UTE KNIGHT & WOLFGANG KOWALSKY, 
DEUTSCHLAND NUR DEN DEUTSCHEN? 64 (1991) (author's translation). 
234 GABRIEL ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE STUDY (1974). 
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giance to a great ideal, to a great body of principles, to a 
great hope of the human race.235 
The vagueness of such formulations surely must give pause. But 
it seems thatJohn Higham is correct to assert that, through the 19th 
century, American national ideology could best be described as a 
large, loose faith236 encompassing such notions as individualism, 
egalitarianism, democracy, and the like. It seems inevitable, as 
Higham also noted, that "a decent multiethnic society must rest on 
a unifying ideology, faith or myth."237 Absent a conception of immi-
gration as a defining Community ideal, there may be problems for 
the Community in reconciling what one would hope would be a 
multi-cultural pluralist sort of ideal with increasingly more closed 
borders to non-European entrants. The sad fact is that human his-
tory has yet to witness a single example of strong nationalism that 
has not been forged in the crucible of war or at least strong self-
definition against some "other. "238 One might also note that the 
immigration ideal of the United States provided a powerful antidote 
to this tendency in our own history the importance of which should 
not be underestimated.239 
One should also consider the question of ideology in this regard. 
235KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 30 (1989) (quoting Mona Harrington, Loyalties: Dual and Divided, in THE POLITICS OF 
ETHNICITY 103 (1982». 
236 See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-
19258 (2d ed. 1981). 
237JOHN HIGHAM, SEND THESE To ME: IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN AMERICA (1984), quoted in 
Karst, supra note 235, at 3l. 
238 The United States provides an interesting example of this phenomenon. It is not entirely 
true that U.S. national identity developed immediately out of the Revolutionary War. Indeed, 
a powerful case can be made that it was not until the War of 1812 that the United States first 
truly began to conceive of itself and act as a nation. The fact that the foe in both cases was 
the same is not coincidental. Rather, the 1812 conflict can be understood in this respect as a 
continuation of the Revolutionary process of American self-identification. See KENDRICK 
CHARLES BABCOCK, THE RISE OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY 1811-19 (1906). 
In post-war Europe, the "Iron Curtain" and the Cold War generally were powerful factors 
in the desire to develop a conception of ''Western Europe" versus the communist "East." 
Though European Community ideology certainly proceeded from an ostensibly non-ideologi-
cal base of economic efficiency and internal quiescence, its relationship to the horrors of the 
mid-twentieth century past and the ideological struggles of the Cold War should not be 
underestimated. See WALTER LIPGENS, A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1945-1947 
(1982); RICHARD VAUGHAN, POST-WAR INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 17-19 (1976); see also Chris-
topher Wendel, The Dialectic of European Political Integration (unpublished manuscript on file 
with author). 
239 For an elegant exploration of this question, see generally LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, THE 
AMERICAN KALEIDOSCOPE (1990). 
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Weiler has noted that, at least until the 1992 dynamic began to 
dominate, a "near absence of overt debate on the left-right spectrum 
existed" due largely to the allegedly non-ideological character of the 
original single market idea.240 Even where there was left-right debate, 
policies invariably verged toward centrist pragmatic choices. Though 
in recent years, "the old nationalist rhetoric has become increasingly 
marginalized and the integrationist ethos has fully ascended, "241 the 
underlying ethos and ideology of European integration is still far 
from clear.242 Further, as Weiler correctly notes, the ideology of the 
market is not neutral and the coming years will likely witness in-
creased recognition of and debate over this fact. At present, how-
ever, we can see no clear Euro-ideology as such. There is only a 
general commitment to democracy and market forces, varying con-
ceptions of the rule of law, rather basic notions of human rights, 
and limitations to state identity and sovereignty. Of course, ideologi-
cal consensus has never been a pre-condition to nationalist senti-
ment. As U.S. history demonstrates, a "large, loose faith" can be 
sufficient. The problem remains, though, to determine against 
which "other" this faith might be defined? What, in other words, 
might be the relationship between Europe as a "shining city on a 
hill" and "fortress Europe?" Can the city truly shine if all the gates 
are closed? 
IV. SOME EFFECTS OF 1992 ON THE GERMAN IMMIGRATION DEBATE 
From the early days of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
the relationship between European integration and German politi-
cal development was an obvious functional and ideological fact. 243 
As Simon Bulmer has argued, with the obvious benefit of hindsight, 
"there was little real choice about the Europeanization of West 
German politics. "244 Though inevitability seems a bit strong given the 
importance of the Atlantic framework to economics and defense 
policy, Germany's relationship with France in particular and its role 
in central Europe more generally were clearly given the highest 
priority by Konrad Adenauer and by all post-war German govern-
240Weiler, supra note 202, at 2474. 
241 [d. at 2475. 
242The 1992 turn to majority voting in the Council would seem a harbinger of change in 
this regard, with current debates over human rights and abortion leading the way. [d. at 2477. 
243 See Simon Bulmer, The European Dimensian, in DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST GERMAN POLI-
TICS 211 (Smith, Patterson, Merkl, eds., 1989). 
244 [d. at 212. 
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ments. It is also correct to ascribe much of the German readiness to 
cede sovereign power to the fact that Germany was "seeking inter-
national acceptance and was thus on probation."245 To this day, the 
desire of mainstream German politicians, especially those of the 
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) 
to "anchor" Germany in the West sometimes strikes this foreign 
observer as simultaneously confident yet fearful,246 One sometimes 
has the sense of a nation/state running away from itself, though, a 
certain underlying core of nationalism is not and has never been far 
from the surface. These tendencies are apparent and have often 
been noted in German foreign policy in recent years, especially in 
relation to the deployment of German troops abroad. They are 
equally important in German internal debate over multilateral solu-
tions to the German foreigners problem. 
There is no question that the German government now sees 
multilateral solutions to the immigration and refugee problem as 
both necessary and desirable. 247 There is, of course, a solid pragmatic 
reason for this position. Europe seems too small and the refugee 
problem too large for states to handle it without cooperation. But 
the relationship between external control and internal politics is 
complex. The Schengen process is often cited as a model of efficient 
inter-governmental cooperation. 
This author remembers quite clearly the cheerful way in which 
one German negotiator at Schengen said in 1990 that the Schengen 
Agreement would not, in his opinion, deteriorate the situation of 
refugees in Germany. He added that it in no way indicated a "fortress 
Europe" mentality, and that he had never seen negotiations that 
were more intense or effective than Schengen, with tremendous 
unity shown between, in particular, the French and German sides.248 
On the other hand, however, he agreed that were Germany to 
245 Id. at 213. 
246The SPD initially opposed German membership into the ECSC on the grounds that it 
would impede German re-unification. It is somewhat ironic, from the perspective of the 
present, to note how re-unification moved from a leftist to a right/nationalist position in 
German politics in less than twenty years. When the SPD formally renounced socialism, it 
joined the integration bandwagon. The FDP expressed support in the late 1960s. See id. at 
215-16. 
247 Indeed, contrary to the rejection of the Treaty by Danish voters, the one percent margin 
of French victory, and the three vote margin in the British House of Commons, the German 
Bundestag voted 543-17 to approve Maastricht on December 2,1992. Approval in the Bun-
destag was unanimous. See Heffernan & Katsantonis, supra note 83, at 7. 
248 Interview with Oberregierungsrat Dr. Nanz, Interior Ministry, Bonn, Germany, June 11, 
1990. (Notes of interview on file with author). 
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continue to undertake a broad liberal reading of its constitutional 
right to asylum, that reading would likely be seen as incompatible 
with the goals of other states under the Schengen umbrella. In other 
words, those who have supported severe restrictions on German 
asylum law could cite Schengen as a pragmatic reason for such 
restrictions. Indeed, in April 1992, CSU Chairman Waigel took the 
somewhat extraordinary step of asserting publicly that his party 
would not support the Schengen treaty unless its passage was linked 
to a constitutional amendment limiting the right of asylum. 249 It is 
important that the recent CDU/CSU proposal to amend Article 16 
of the Basic Law250 was submitted along with legislation implement-
ing the Schengen Agreement.251 
On the functional level, the immediate impact of Schengen and 
Maastricht on the German immigration and asylum dilemma is 
unlikely to be as dramatic as that of the amendment to the Basic 
Law. Nonetheless, like the internal legal structures discussed else-
where,252 external agreements have important effects on public dis-
course. Schengen has already affected the Article 16 debate. One 
often hears comments such as, ''we should not be unduly liberal so 
as not to upset our partners in the process" and "the problem 
requires a multi-national solution so we must compromise"253 As to 
the Aussiedlerprograms and the German maintenance of jus sangui-
nis and highly discretionary naturalization practices, the role of 
Schengen, and 1992 unification generally, appears much less sig-
nificant. Only the unlikely ascendence of a powerful "unity" version 
of the EC would affect these matters in any substantial way. Unfor-
tunately, then, the net effect of multilateral European initiatives may 
be to delegitimate Germany's liberal asylum laws254 while, to some 
degree, reaffirms its restrictive and volkisch citizenship/naturaliza-
tion laws at least as to non-EC nationals. This dualistic sort of Ger-
249 Germany: The CSU Wants a Revision of the Constitution to Make Right of Asylum More 
Restridive, Agence Europe, Apr. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AHeur File. 
250BT-Drs. 12/2112 v. 18.2. 1992, cited in Pfaff, supra note 137, at 133. 
251 BR-Drs. 121/92 v. 21.2 1992, cited in Pfaff, supra note 137, at 133. 
252 See generally Kanstroom, supra note 1. 
253 Interview with Dr. Nanz, supra note 248. 
254 Indeed, as German commentators have noted, the main concerns of law makers in the 
recent asylum debate, Schengen and Dublin notwithstanding, have not been about fair asylum 
proceedings so much as border control. Bitterer Larbeer, Suddeutsche Zeitung,Jan. 18, 1993 
at 4. Noting the rash (and quickly withdrawn) suggestion of Interior Minister Seisters to place 
Turkey on the list of "safe" countries, the editors ofthe Suddeutsche Zeitung noted ominously 
that "new surprises are certain." Id. 
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man response to the EC has been noted before. As Ralf Dahrendorf 
put it, 
many Germans use language such as 'German unification 
must remain firmly embedded in the process of European 
integration-but do they know what they are saying? And 
are they acting as if they believe it? ... my impression is 
that in an important sense Europe has remained a fair-
weather concept for the majority of leading German poli-
ticians . . . German professions of Europeanism are not 
insincere, but when something comes along that is re-
garded as more important, they are quickly forgot-
ten .... 255 
One might add, in light of the CSU's position on Schengen and 
Article 16, that Europeanism can be a foul weather concept as well 
as a fair one. The point, however, is that Europeanism does not as 
yet offer an anti-nationalist, multi-cultural, or humanitarian chal-
lenge to the basic orientation of the ruling German parties regard-
ing the questions of immigration, asylum, and citizenship. It thus 
appears that, at least as to citizenship and immigration, Peter Glotz, 
a well-known German Social Democrat, was wrong when he wrote 
that "the nation-state is economically, ecologically, militarily, and 
culturally out of date."256 
Meanwhile, the influence on other states of the German approach 
to citizenship can also be seen. When, for example, Giscard 
D'Estaing, obviously prompted by the success of Jean Marie Le Pen, 
proposed that France should adopt the jus sanguinis, was he not 
influenced by German ideas?257 And, does not this export stand in 
sharp contrast to the alternative German possibility of influencing 
other European states to adopt the more liberal German asylum 
model? Germany, it seems, is destined strongly to influence Euro-
pean attitudes towards the specific problems of citizenship, immi-
gration, and asylum, as well as the general problem of acceptance 
of pre-political facts as a basis for social identity. One can only hope 
that, if the lessons of the past are insufficient, the recognition of this 
255RALF DAHRENDORF, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE 135-37 (1990). 
256 [d. at 132 (quoting Peter Glotz). ButJurgen Habermas is also correct that the German 
state in particular cannot legitimately rest on prepolitical facts like culture and national 
history. If anything, the uncontrollable rush to reunifY proved the wisdom and necessity for 
the continual reaffirmation of "liberal institutions" in every forum in which they are chal-
lenged. 
257Ironically, Giscard himself was born in Koblenz, Germany. 
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responsibility to the future will lead Germany to resist the siren 
songs of ethnic nationalism, to liberalize its citizenship laws, and to 
maintain the liberal legal structures upon which so much of its 
post-war identity has been based. As Willy Brandt once put it: 
If it is to pay more than lip service to the concept of 
'responsibility in Europe,' a country has to present an open 
heart and arms. It has to look upon fellowship with people 
from other cultures as an enriching experience, and it 
must develop asylum and immigration policies which can 
allay its citizens' fears of a threat to their existence.258 
CONCLUSION 
There is no question that the goal of a free internal EC market 
cannot be achieved fully without extensive cooperation on matters 
of external immigration and asylum. Controversy to date has cen-
tered for the most part on whether harmonization should take place 
completely at the Community (or Union) level or through inter-gov-
ernmental initiatives like Schengen. In terms of developing compre-
hensive structures which incorporate a workable rule of law, it would 
seem that Community-level approaches are more desirable. 259 More, 
however, is required of a unified immigration regime than simply 
functionally effective rules on visas, employment, social benefits, 
family reunification, and the like. Absent a Community vision on the 
relationship between immigration and asylum, on the one hand, 
and xenophobia and racist violence on the other, strategies based 
on control, information-sharing, and police empowerment are the 
only things likely to be achieved. Such developments, as the German 
situation demonstrates, can have harmful social consequences of 
their own. Beyond the immediate dangers to de facto refugees, they 
tend to harden the distinction between citizens and foreigners and 
to capitulate to the most strident voices of resurgent nationalism. 
Distinctions between asylum-seekers and immigrants can certainly 
be made, and non-EC immigration can certainly be controlled with-
out the complete jettisoning of Germany's noble experiment in 
judicial review and individual rights and without rejection of the 
idea that immigration may be enriching in ways that go far beyond 
economICS. 
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